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Groundbreaking new book integrates biology, psychology, philosophy to explain moral behavior
"It is well written, groundbreaking in its integration of three fields of enquiry (biology, psychology and philosophy), and superbly organized."
--Paul Thompson, professor of biology and philosophy, University of Toronto
"I maintain that the natural and social sciences can contribute significantly to answering traditional ethical questions about the nature and function of morality and the justification of moral claims."
--William Rottschaefer, professor of philosophy, Lewis & Clark College
PORTLAND, Ore.--"The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency" (Cambridge University Press, 1998), a new book by William Rottschaefer, professor of philosophy at Lewis & Clark College, integrates recent findings and theories in evolutionary theory, biology and psychology to explore what it means to behave morally. The book is part of the Cambridge Studies Series in Philosophy and Biology.
Rottschaefer's book explains how people acquire and put into practice their capacities to act morally and how these capacities are reliable means to achieving true moral beliefs, proper moral motivations and successful moral actions.
Rottschaefer, who describes himself as a scientific naturalistic philosopher, was motivated in his 10-year endeavor by a commitment to "the synoptic vision," to "see things as a whole."
"I maintain that the natural and social sciences can contribute significantly to answering traditional ethical questions about the nature and function of morality and the justification of moral claims," he said.
Rottschaefer begins by asking four questions: What counts as moral agency? How is it acquired? How is it put to work? And how is moral practice justified?
"I then try to address those questions by building a philosophical theory based on recent findings and theories from biology and psychology," he said.
His model incorporates the views of scholars such as sociobiologist E.O. Wilson, developmental psychologist Martin Hoffman, and social cognitive psychologist Albert Bandura.
It also includes and critiques the views of philosophers such as Michael Ruse and Robert Richards, who have recently explored the possibilities for an evolutionary ethics.
What counts as moral agency?
To ordinary people, it entails sufficient cognitive capacity, the ability to choose, and doing the right thing, like helping others, Rottschaefer comments.
"Scientifically it turns out that there is a big dispute between social learning theorists and developmental psychologists over what counts as moral agency," he says.
In his book, Rottschaefer attempts to mediate the dispute. He uses Bandura's social cognitive theory to understand the cognitive capacities of moral agents.
"If one acts on impulse," he explains, "it wouldn't be an act in the moral realm. But if one reflects upon the action, then it counts."
So it's not enough to have the ability to choose, one also has to have the ability to reflect.
Rottschaefer draws upon what he describes as generally agreed upon examples of moral action.
"Most people think that caring for children is the right thing to do," Rottschaefer explains "But if they are asked why it is the right thing to do, they may say that they 'feel that's the case' or 'that's what they've been taught' or 'my religious faith tells me.'"
Philosophers are more likely to answer that moral action "promotes the greatest good for the greatest number" or "that it is one's duty."
Rottschaefer takes views about values to be like scientific hypotheses: "If we suppose that it's valuable that humans continue in existence, then we might expect biological tendencies to be built into us to help our children and to help people with whom we are familiar, and these are protypical moral capacities."
He looks at the classic moral capacity of empathy, for example, and notes that psychologists have shown that children even as young as two or three demonstrate the capacity for empathy.
Does that mean humans are hard-wired for moral agency? Is there a gene that determines moral action?
The theory, Rottschaefer responds, is that empathic capacities may be based in a gene complex, not a single gene, and they need social learning for their development.
The most controversial of the questions Rottschaefer addresses in his book is his fourth question: How is moral practice justified?
"Most philosophers argue that the sciences are no help at all in answering that question," he says. "I argue that the sciences, particularly biology and psychology, have a lot to contribute and that other philosophers who have postulated relationships between the sciences and ethics have not gone far enough.
"I argue that there are objective values that the sciences can help us discern and provide justification for," he says, "and that's not ordinarily thought to be the case."
He concludes that a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency is a plausible one and worthy of further investigation, and that the integrationist hypotheses upon which the model is built provide a fruitful approach to the investigation of moral agency.
Rotttschaefer received his bachelor's degree in philosophy and letters (cum laude) and his master's degree in philosophy and a licentiate in sacred theology from St. Louis University. He earned a master's degree in physics from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and his doctorate in philosophy from Boston University.
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