Opposing an Ideological War: Lessons from Vietnam

Despite a decade of public dissent, hundreds of thousands of protestors and peace rallies staged nationwide, it took a handful of senators to halt the war in Vietnam. A new book edited by University of Arkansas historian Randall Woods examines the origins of their opposition. In the process, it suggests that challenging a president's foreign policy can be both conscientious and patriotic -- a fight for American values, rather than a betrayal of them.

Published by Cambridge University Press, Vietnam and the American Political Tradition reveals how seven U.S. Senators -- from different regions, different backgrounds and with different political beliefs -- each came to oppose the war in Vietnam. Essays written by leading historians and political scientists explore the political views of Senators Ernest Gruenig, George McGovern, Frank Church, J. William Fulbright, Mike Mansfield, Al Gore and John Sherman Cooper. Additional chapters discuss the evolution of the war and the responses of Presidents Johnson and Nixon to their critics.

The idea for the volume arose out of Woods' research for his prize-winning biography of Sen. J. William Fulbright. "While examining Fulbright's anti-war position, I looked at other individuals who opposed the war in the Senate. What impressed me was the variety of regions and political philosophies they represented," Woods explained. "Here was a group of men with disparate backgrounds and beliefs who all came to a similar conclusion -- that the war in Vietnam threatened the principles and traditions that underlay American life."

Rather than contesting the purpose of the war -- halting the international spread of communism -- the senators focused their opposition on its effects. Among the negative consequences they perceived were the unchecked growth of the military-industrial complex and the federal government's disregard for American civil liberties. They felt these effects undermined the nation's political integrity and threatened quality of life in their individual regions.

The senators' sensitivity to regional cultures and traditions figured greatly into their dissension, according to Woods. Each of the essays in his edited volume shows how the regional and political backgrounds of these senators formed the basis of their opposition. For example, as a highly educated conservative and an advocate of international relations, Fulbright felt that stifling freedom of speech prevented an intellectual examination of the war. Further, he feared that the increasing power of the military-industrial complex enabled it to influence and interfere with foreign policy.

"These regional differences are particularly important to note," Woods said. "The key to understanding U.S. foreign policy is not to look at negotiations between our government and other nations but to look at American culture and politics. More than any other nation, American foreign policy is a reflection of our domestic prejudices and traditions."

The executive branch largely designs foreign policy, but Congress -- which represents the various regions, interest groups and traditions of the country -- can serve as a litmus test for how well an administration's policies reflect and serve American interests. Within the context of Vietnam, the fact that senators from different parts of the nation and different political parties found such varied reasons to oppose the war lent strength to their case in many ways. In other ways, however, these differences may have impeded their progress.

"These senators didn't necessarily come together in their cause. They weren't close individually. That's one of the reasons why the opposition wasn't more effective," Woods said. "They came at it in an uncoordinated way, from their own perspectives. There was no caucus or lobby or leadership in the group. They just gradually and methodically chiseled away at congressional support for the war."

In 1973, Congress exercised its right to end funding for the war, and American forces retreated from the conflict without glory. Nixon, himself, blamed Congress for the military's inability to obtain victory in Vietnam.

Though Woods acknowledges differences between the war in Vietnam and the recent military action in Iraq, his book holds significant relevance at this time -- particularly for those who stand silently or secretly opposed to the current administration's foreign policies. The handful of senators who spoke out against Vietnam could serve as models for congressmen today, Woods suggested.

Above all, the wars in Vietnam and Iraq are both ideological, Woods said, drawing comparisons between the threat of international communism during the Cold War and the threat of international terrorism today. As a result, the senators who stood against the war in Vietnam had to rely on their reputations as veterans, patriots and staunch anti-communists to lend credibility to their dissent. Any accusation of being "soft on communism" would have undermined their opposition.

The same must hold true for those who step forward today. But in addition to demonstrating unquestionable loyalty to America and to democracy, modern-day dissenters should follow the example of their Vietnam-era forbears -- criticizing the effects of war and not its ideological basis, Woods recommended.

"Then as now, the question must be whether the threat we perceived justified the action we took. It's a question of appropriateness," Woods said. "Were our interests -- economically and strategically defined -- so threatened as to warrant a preemptive war, the arousal of international opposition and the risk of diplomatic isolation?"